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RECENT INCOME TRENDS FOR TOP EXECUTIVES:
EVIDENCE FROM TAX RETURN DATA
Seth H. Giertz and Jacob A. Mortenson

We examine income trends for top executives, focusing on the years 2000 to 2010,
with special emphasis on the period surrounding the Great Recession. First, we
merge Execucomp executive compensation records with IRS tax records. We compare incomes from our Execucomp sample to top incomes reported by Piketty and
Saez (2003). We disaggregate executive income trends by industry, showing which
industries are driving the divergence in top executive incomes. We compare our
results to findings from Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) and Kaplan and Rauh (2010),
who examine trends in top incomes for broad occupation and industry categories
for years prior to the Great Recession. We also decompose these income trends by
income source to see which components are driving the observed changes. We find
that stock options are by far the most volatile component of executive pay. Options
are the key driver of both short-term swings and longer-term trends in top executive
pay. However, stock awards are also a large and growing component. We find much
greater variation in income across years than across industries. Executive incomes
are most volatile at the very top of income distribution. In general, trends for top
executives in finance and non-finance industries are quite similar; however; for
those above the 99.9th percentile of the income distribution, the decline in income
from 2006 to 2009 was much more pronounced for executives in finance.
Keywords: executive compensation, top incomes
JEL Codes: H2, J3

I. INTRODUCTION
ver the past several decades, income has become much more heavily concentrated
at the very top of the income distribution. While the top decile has fared better
than rest of the distribution, the most dramatic changes have involved the extreme right
tail of the income distribution — i.e., those in the top tenths of the top 1 percent. The
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recent financial crisis has heightened concerns that the incentives of executives are
misaligned with the interests of shareholders, or at least the interests of society at large.
Additionally, there is a perception that while the top of the distribution has enjoyed
tremendous income gains, incomes at the median (and more generally for the bulk of
Americans) have stagnated.1
Incomes of high-level executives are frequently used as examples of rising inequality.
In attempts to better align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, executives are often rewarded (or punished) based on the performance of the firm; however,
to a great extent, firm performance is driven by forces outside any individual’s control.2
A growing perception is that executive pay is often excessive, not merit-based, and that
incentives for managers and shareholders are not properly aligned. Some argue that the
often super-high incomes of executives are to a large extent the product of malfeasance
or gaming of the system (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009).
Others argue that executive incomes at large firms (particularly financial institutions)
are artificially high due to implicit government guarantees that generally protect bondholders against losses and in so doing, lower borrowing costs and encourage excessive
risk taking (Stern and Feldman, 2004).
Top executives are highly concentrated within the very top of the income distribution. However, they likely remain a small minority even among the very top income
groups. Based on Execucomp data, Kaplan and Rauh (2010) report that Execucomp
executives comprise roughly 3 percent of the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution.
Including imputations for executives in non-Execucomp firms only modestly raises
these estimates.3
Previous studies have used executive compensation data (usually required as part of
SEC filings) to examine trends in executive or CEO compensation (Eissa and Giertz,
2006; Goolsbee, 2000; Hall and Liebman, 2000; Frydman and Saks, 2010). Other
studies have used tax data to examine top incomes, but these studies usually cannot
separately identify executives from others with high incomes. Bakija, Cole, and Heim
(2010) is an exception in that they impute occupations for tax filers, including executives. However, no study to our knowledge has merged executive compensation data
directly with U.S. tax returns.
In this paper, we examine income trends for top executives, focusing on the years
2000 to 2010, with special emphasis on the period surrounding the Great Recession.
1

2

3

The extent to which this is the case depends heavily on how income is measured. Meyer and Sullivan
(2012), Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon (2012), and Saez (2013) provide examples.
For example, Kahneman (2011, p. 205) notes that, “A very generous estimate of the correlation [coefficient]
between the success of the firm and the quality of its CEO might be as high as 0.30[.]”
Using tax data, Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) report that non-financial executives, managers, and supervisors plus financial professionals make up roughly 60 percent of the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution.
This is a much broader sample than the Execucomp, and includes many non-executives, executives who
are not present in SEC filing (because they are not among the highest paid at their firms), and executives
at non-Execucomp firms.
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The definition of income used is a product of the information available in the tax and
Execucomp datasets. Each of the two datasets has its strengths and weaknesses; however,
neither allows for the calculation of Haig-Simons income. For a given period, HaigSimons income equals consumption plus the change in wealth occurring in that period.
Income measures based on tax data deviate from the Haig-Simons standard in that they
usually cannot account for tax exclusions and tax-deferred income — for example from
pensions or retirement savings accounts and from some forms of capital income.4 Tax
evasion also causes measures based on tax data to deviate from Haig-Simons income.
Some forms of deferred income can be imputed from executive compensation records;
however, these data also do not capture all income and, as with tax data, some income
sources are not reported in the period in which the income is earned. Our income
measures are based on others used in the tax literature. In the following section, we
describe the sources of income used in this paper, and highlight the timing of income
reporting. This provides an indication of which sources are likely to yield deviations
from the Haig-Simons standard.
In the next section, we provide background on our datasets and how they are merged.
In Section III, we compare incomes from our Execucomp sample to top incomes reported
by Piketty and Saez (2003). We decompose these income trends by income source to see
which components are driving changes. We find that stock options are by far the most
volatile component of executive pay. Options are the key driver in both short-term swings
and longer-term trends in top executive pay. However, stock awards are also a large and
growing component — although until recently they were not separately reported. We
disaggregate executive income trends by industry, showing which industries are driving
the divergence in top executive incomes. We compare our results to the findings from
Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) and Kaplan and Rauh (2010), who examine trends in top
incomes for broad occupation and industry categories for years prior to the Great Recession. We find greater variation in income across years than across industries. Executive
incomes are most volatile at the very top of the income distribution. In general, trends
for top executives in finance and non-finance industries are quite similar; although for
those above the 99.9th percentile of the income distribution, the decline in income from
2006 to 2009 was much more pronounced for executives in finance.
II. CONSTRUCTING A DATASET: MATCHING EXECUTIVES TO TAX RETURNS
We link individual tax returns from the Internal Revenue Service’s Compliance Data
Warehouse (CDW) with Execucomp compensation records for CEOs plus the next
four highest paid executives (based on salary and bonus income).5 By exactly match4

5

Tax-deferred income may eventually show up on tax returns. However, a Haig-Simons income calculation
would require information on income when it accrues (as opposed to when it is realized).
For the most recent years, compensation is reported for the CEO, CFO, and the next three highest paid
executives. In most instances, this amounts to the firm’s five highest-paid executives.
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ing executives to their tax returns, we are able to examine the tax information for this
important and primarily very high-income group. Conversely, we are able to examine
income sources for these tax filers that are not reported to the IRS.
The Execucomp data contain information on 38,500 unique executives spanning the
years 1992 to 2010. These data are compiled by Standard and Poor’s from proxy statements and 10-K forms (filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission) and are part
of S&P’s Compustat database. Included in the dataset are corporations in the Standard and
Poor’s S&P 1500 Index (i.e., corporations in the S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400, and S&P
Small Cap 600). The data are primarily a subset of U.S. taxpayers near the very top of
the income distribution. The compensation information includes salaries, option awards,
option values, long-term incentive plan payments (LTIP), bonuses, stock grants, and many
other forms of taxable and non-taxable income. The company information includes total
assets, market capitalization, earnings, total employment, and other financial information.
Annual Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use Files (PUFs) have been the most
important source for tracking trends in top incomes for the United States. However,
the PUFs remove information that could be used to identify individual taxpayers (or to
link taxpayers across years). A panel of tax returns was made public for years 1979 to
1990, but the sample sizes are too small to effectively examine trends at the very top of
the income distribution. In terms of confidential tax data, the SOI maintains a stratified
random sample of tax returns that heavily oversample top incomes. While this dataset
includes tax returns for executives at the very top of the income distribution, it does not
sample many with moderately high (as opposed to very high) income.
The CDW data, on the other hand, include tax returns for the universe of U.S. tax
filers for the years 1996 to 2011 and are only available to a handful of groups within
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and Joint Committee on Taxation.
Major sources of income (e.g., taxable income, deductions, credits), commonly used
forms (e.g., Form 1040, Form W-2, and various schedules), and other information are
available for every return.
Even with the universe of tax returns, matching tax information to executives is
complex. The Execucomp does not include unique Individual Taxpayer Identification
Numbers (ITINs), which would make the match straightforward,6 and no single shared
and unique identifier is included in both datasets. However, by matching based on an
array of variables available in both datasets, we can produce exact matches for most
executives. Because W-2 forms (submitted by employers) are incorporated into the
CDW beginning in 2000, we have several pieces of identifying information in both
datasets.7 These include the company EIN and the last name, first name, and middle
6

7

For most taxpayers, Social Security numbers double as taxpayers’ ITINs. Taxpayer Identification Numbers
(TINs) refer to a category of identifiers (of which ITIN is one), which are not necessarily unique taxpayer
identifiers. The Employer Identification Number (EIN) is an example of a TIN that is not unique to each
taxpayer.
We focus on the period beginning with 2000 because our match rate is much worse pre-2000, when Form
W-2 is not available.
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initial of the individual. Year of birth and sex from the Social Security Administration’s
Data Master File (DM-1) are also used. After matching TINs to the Execucomp, we
retrieve tax information from the Statistics of Income (SOI) Databank and Form 1040
from the CDW.
For the years 2000 to 2010, our core sample contains 214,500 tax observations,
120,500 Execucomp observations, and 245,500 total observations (i.e., observations that
contain tax or Execucomp information).8 We match 89,500 of the 120,500 observations
(a 74 percent matching rate).9 While individuals may fall out or re-enter the Execucomp
sample over time (e.g., by leaving a firm or dropping in their firm’s compensation rankings), the tax data are available for every year in which the individual filed a tax return
or had certain information returns filed on his behalf.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the company and individual data from both data sources.
We define executive income (based on Execucomp data) as the sum of the value of
salaries, bonuses, options exercised, long-term incentive plan payments (LTIP), and

Table 1
IRS and Execucomp Income (2000$,Thousands):
Sample Size and Means for the Matched Sample
(Exact Matches Between Executives and IRS Records)
Year

Observations

Taxable Income

Executive Compensation

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

8,636
8,637
8,685
8,789
8,092
6,983
7,411
8,037
7,783
7,404
6,971

1,904
1,432
1,297
1,452
1,948
2,279
2,367
2,449
1,904
1,683
2,091

2,685
1,878
1,523
1,777
2,257
2,667
2,751
2,709
2,056
1,805
2,360

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IRS CDW and Execucomp data

8

9

Note two sample restrictions. First, tax observations after an individual’s year of death are dropped. Second,
the record for executives with multiple records in a given year — for example, if the person held positions
with multiple firms during the year — the record with the largest income is kept and the others are dropped.
Appendix A provides more details on our matching strategy.
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Table 2
Average Annual Firm and Individual Economic Statistics (Matched Sample)
Execucomp Firms (2000$, Millions)

Total assets
Market value

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Total

12,900
6,220

73,200
20,700

24,245,000
11,225,000

Execucomp Individuals (2000$, Thousands)

Salary
Bonus
Options exercised
Non-equity incentive plan compensation
Stock awards
Long-term incentive plan compensation
Restricted stock grants
Execucomp income

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Total

369
266
812
363
617
89
255
2,220

248
992
1,049
5,219
1,563
668
1,244
6,231

3,007,000
24,100,000
77,200,000
14,000,000
22,700,000
4,580,000
13,200,000
17,710,000

IRS Measures (2000$, Thousands)

Wages
Taxable interest
Taxable dividends
Schedule C income
Schedule D income
Adjusted gross income
Deductions
Taxable income

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Total

1,993
71
155
13
465
2,654
339
1,849

4,612
1,242
2,177
327
4,658
7,816
1,696
5,149

16,164,000
576,000
1,254,000
102,000
3,771
21,519,000
2,752,000
14,996,000

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IRS CDW and Execucomp data

restricted stock grants for the years 2000 through 2005. Due to changes in SEC reporting requirements, LTIP and restricted stock grants are reported differently beginning
in 2006. We follow the approach of Frydman and Jenter (2010) by replacing these two
items with non-equity incentive plan compensation and the fair value of stock awards
after 2005. Based on the tax data, we define taxable income as adjusted gross income
(AGI) reported on Form 1040 less deductions (the larger of itemized deductions or the
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standard deduction) and capital gains (i.e., Schedule D profit or loss). Adjusted gross
income is the difference between total income — again, as defined on Form 1040 — and
adjustments (i.e., above-the-line deductions). Note that capital gains are often examined
separately when using tax data, in part because they are only observed when realized,
as opposed to when they accrue. Capital gains realizations are generally more volatile
and lumpy than other income sources, and often the timing of realizations is heavily
influenced by tax changes and the performance of the broader stock market.
In most cases, these various sources of executive income are subject to taxation as
ordinary income. Firms generally may deduct these expenses in the same period in
which the executive is required to report them for tax purposes; however, since 1993,
the deductibility of most “non-performance-based” compensation is capped at $1 million per employee.
The time at which income sources are subject to taxation varies. For example, income
from salaries and bonuses is taxed in the period in which is it earned. Restricted stock
grants, non-equity incentive plans, and other long-term incentive plans are also generally taxed as ordinary income, but usually not in the period that they are issued (or
in which the incentive is put in place). In most cases, these income sources are taxed
when they vest.10 Vesting occurs after a set period of time or after certain performance
measures are reached. Taxing at the time of vesting is similar to the treatment of
salaries and bonuses, since the executive has not officially earned the income prior to
vesting.
Traditionally, non-qualified options represent the vast majority of stock options for
executives (Hall and Liebman, 2000). The value of non-qualified options is generally
taxable when the option is exercised, as opposed to when it is issued or vested. Because
these options are generally not tradable, they are deemed to have no “readily ascertainable market value” when issued; otherwise, they would be taxed at the time of issue.
The difference between the market price and the exercise price is reported as salary
income on Form W-2 and is subject to income and payroll taxes.11
III. GENERAL INCOME TRENDS AND DECOMPOSING SOURCES
A. Background on Top Incomes
In their heavily cited work, Piketty and Saez (2003) document a divergence in income
shares received by those at the top of the income distribution from those in the rest
of the distribution. Piketty and Saez show that top income shares fell abruptly during
10

11

Stock awards that are immediately vested are less common and are taxed in the period in which they are
issued.
By contrast, qualified stock options — a very small component of overall stock options — are not taxed
when issued or exercised, but when the recipient sells the stock purchased via the options. At this point,
the realized income is generally treated as long-term capital gains. Qualified stock options are limited to a
maximum of $100,000 per employee and, in contrast to non-qualified options, firms may not deduct their
value for corporate tax purposes. Bickley (2012) provides more details.
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World War II and held relatively steady for the next few decades. Incomes at the very
top of the distribution are consistently more volatile, experiencing sharper drops in
downturns and sharper upticks during expansions. However, over longer time frames,
clear patterns emerge. Beginning in the 1970s, the divergence of top incomes became a
dominant phenomenon (Figure 1).12 Excluding capital gains, the share of total reported
income accruing to the top 10 percent rose from 32 percent in 1973 to over 46 percent
by 2010. This divergence, however, is primarily driven by the top 1 percent. Whereas
the share received by the top 1 percent rose by 124 percent over this period, the share
received by those in the 95th to 99th percentiles rose by 27 percent. Those in the 90th to
95th percentiles saw their share increase by only 12 percent.13
An important caveat to the analysis by Piketty and Saez (2003) and the analysis
presented later in this paper is that income shares are measured based on repeated crosssections. Repeated cross-sections focus on segments of the annual income distribution,
without regard to the position of these taxpayers in previous (or subsequent) years.
Put another way, this type of analysis does not follow the same people over time. The
composition of individuals within an income group may vary greatly from year to year.
The question of income volatility or mobility is not our focus, but is an important issue
that may influence normative implications from this type of analysis.14
There is no consensus as to the primary factors driving changes at the top of the
income distribution. However, very-high top marginal tax rates coincided with the sharp
compression during World War II. In fact, in 1942 President Roosevelt called for a 100
percent tax rate (for the top tax bracket) saying “no American citizen ought to have a
net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more than $25,000 a year …” (Bank, Stark,
and Thorndike, 2008, p. 97). Shortly thereafter, the top federal tax rate reached 94
percent (for income over $200,000). Top rates stayed above 90 percent until the 1960s
when the top statutory rate was lowered to 70 percent. By 1988, after full enactment
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the statutory rate for top incomes fell all the way to
28 percent. Thus, the shift towards pre-1930s income concentration loosely coincided
with the lowering of top tax rates, especially since the 1980s.
12

13

14

While the divergence at the top of the income distribution is well established, the methodology employed
can affect the magnitude of the changes. For example, using restricted (and not top coded) Current Population Survey data, Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon (2012) and Burkhauser et al. (2012) show that
adjusting for factors such as changes in family structure, income sharing within the family, the value of
government transfers, and tax exclusions (such as for employer-provided health insurance) generates different results, relative to using the tax unit as the unit for analysis and not accounting for information not
reported on tax returns. These methodological factors have major implications when examining income
growth for households in the middle and at the bottom of the income distribution — showing substantial
gains accruing to the bottom half of the distribution over the past few decades, as opposed to stagnation
or decline. Under their alternative approach, the degree of divergence in the overall income distribution
is also lessened.
Unless otherwise noted, income shares from the overall distribution of taxpayers are from Piketty and
Saez (2003).
Corak (2013), Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010), Auten and Gee (2009) and Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish
(2008) examine the mobility of top incomes over time.
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Figure 1
U.S. Top 0.1% Pre-Tax Income Share and Composition
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Source: Piketty and Saez, 2003, updated to 2011

A series of international studies of top incomes edited by Atkinson and Piketty (2007)
do not rule out taxes as playing a major rule. However, the studies do not definitively
support such a proposition either, suggesting that if taxes are the key factor, their impact
may accrue over a number of years. Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) present more than
a half-dozen hypotheses that attempt to explain the divergence at the top of the income
distribution. One such hypothesis argues that executive compensation is a driving factor.
Some evidence suggests that the rapid rise in executive compensation may be consistent
with efficient business practices (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Gabaix and Landier, 2008;
Gabaix, Landier, and Sauvagnat, 2013; Kaplan and Rauh, 2013; Mankiw, 2013), while
others argue that principal-agent problems have allowed executives to take advantage of
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shareholders by awarding themselves lavish compensation packages (Bebchuk, Fried,
and Walker, 2002; Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2009), or that recent income divergence has
been driven by economic rents (Bivens and Mishel, 2013). These competing views are
also discussed by Frydman and Saks (2010) in their examination of long-run trends in
CEO compensation.
Kaplan and Rauh (2010) look at the role of executives in the divergence of incomes
at the top of the income distribution. They further examine trends for executives in the
finance sector as compared to those in other sectors. Using data from 1994 and 2004,
they report that average realized income for executives in the finance sector and nonfinance sectors both increased by similar rates — cumulatively, an over 200 percent
increase — and average income for those in the finance sector was about 50 percent
higher than those in non-financial sectors in both years.15 The presence of both groups
at the very top of the income distribution increased, but the increase was somewhat
greater for executives in non-financial sectors. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) further measure
the contribution of other high-paid groups to the growth in top incomes. These include
non-executives in the finance industry, as well as lawyers, professional athletes, and
celebrities. They conclude that “powerful CEOs or poor corporate governance cannot
possibly be more than a small part of the picture of increasing income inequality, even
at the very upper end of the distribution … [although] this does not rule out the possibility that poor corporate governance affects CEO pay” (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010, p. 44).
Many studies have used executive compensation data to examine income trends and
behavioral responses to taxation, including Eissa and Giertz (2006), Goolsbee (2000),
Hall and Liebman (1998, 2000), and Frydman and Jenter (2010).16 While these studies
include sources of income not reported on tax returns, they also omit important tax
information. For example, several use executive compensation data to measure behavioral responses to changes in marginal tax rates. They generally find that the earnings
of executives are less responsive to changes in tax rates than are other high-income
groups studied using tax data; however, executive compensation may be an imperfect
proxy for taxable income. Several items, such as itemized deductions or income from
outside the executive’s firm, are not observed in executive compensation data. In general, capital gains realizations are also not observed. If these are important margins by
which high-income taxpayers respond to tax changes, estimated elasticities based solely
on executive compensation data may substantially underestimate overall behavioral
responses to taxation.
In the remainder of this section, we examine recent income trends for executives, a
group heavily represented at the top of the income distribution. We compare our results
to trends for high-income groups more generally, as reported by Piketty and Saez (2003)
(updated through 2011) and to trends by industry and occupation as reported by Bakija,
15

16

The overall growth rate in both sectors is sensitive to their choice of income measure. Income growth
for both sectors is much lower using an ex ante measure of income. However, under both measures, the
growth rate is similar for executives in both sectors.
Frydman and Jenter (2010) provide a review of this literature as it pertains to CEOs.
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Cole, and Heim (2010), who also examine income trends using tax data through 2005; the
latter study includes industry and occupation information inferred from W-2 forms and
the occupation field on the Form 1040. Among those at the top of the income distribution, they report different income trends for several occupations, including executives.
This work also relates closely to that of Kaplan and Rauh (2010).
B. The Changing Composition of Executive Compensation and Top Incomes
Figure 1 presents trends in mean pre-tax income shares over time and decomposed
by source. This figure is based on public-use IRS data compiled by Piketty and Saez
(2003). Instead of presenting a figure for overall tax returns, we focus on the top 0.1 of
1 percent of returns. As shown later in this section, this group includes a large share of
top executives — in fact more than 30 percent of our matched sample — and accounts
for 80 percent of taxable income and Execucomp income in our matched sample. Figure 1 focuses on the very top of the income distribution; however, the overall income
distribution is an important component of the measure because income is presented
as a share of income for the population of taxpayers. While the focus of this paper is
primarily on years 2000 to 2010, Figure 1 extends to 1975 for perspective.
The long-term trend for this top income group is strongly positive, as discussed earlier
for top incomes more generally. The share of income accruing to the top 0.1 percent in
Figure 1 averages 6.7 percent and ranges from 2.6 percent in 1975 to 12.3 percent in
2007. With the stacked diagram, one can see the growth of each income source over
this period and the relative size of the source compared to the total. For example, in
2007, when this top group’s income accounted for 12.3 percent of income reported
by all taxpayers, over 34 percent of this share can be attributed to capital gains (i.e.,
4.8 percentage points) and 23 percent can be attributed to salaries (i.e., 3.3 percentage
points).
The income share for the top 0.1 percent is extremely volatile. For example, the income
share rose by over 67 percent (7.3 percent to 12.3 percent) from 2002 to 2007 and then
fell by more than 32 percent (12.3 percent to 8.3 percent) from 2007 to 2009. These
wide fluctuations are driven predominantly by net capital income.17 Capital income is
both a large share of income in Figure 1 — on average, comprising an over 27 percent
share for this group — and very volatile. Salaries and business income are also major
income sources for this group. Combined, these two sources account for more than
43 percent of the income of this group on average. Salary income has grown roughly
on par with overall income for this group. Salary income was more volatile after the
recession of the early 2000s than during the Great Recession. Business income grew
much more rapidly over this period than income from other major income sources.
However, a substantial portion of this growth likely represents the shifting of income
17

Capital gains are closely tied to the performance of the stock market and are only reported when realized
— i.e., when the taxpayer chooses to sell the asset. A presentation based on capital gains accrual would
likely look very different and probably be less volatile.

924

National Tax Journal

from Subchapter C to Subchapter S corporations following the Tax Reform Act of
1986 (Slemrod, 1996; Carroll and Joulfaian, 1997; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012).
Figure 2 displays trends in the mean components of Execucomp executive income for
the years 1992 to 2010. Executive compensation over these two decades is characterized
by large peaks and valleys. As in Figure 1, incomes are especially volatile in the years
surrounding the last two recessions. Also, despite a 50 percent decline between 2006
and 2009, mean executive compensation increased 124 percent over the 19-year period.
Frydman and Jenter (2010) document the growth in pay for CEOs and other top
executives since the 1930s. The trends we report in mean compensation from the last
decade (in Figure 2) are consistent with their trends in median compensation from the
1990s, in which executive compensation continues a rapid growth trend that began in
the mid 1970s. Our data show that from 2000 to 2002, mean executive compensation

Figure 2
Executive Composition by Source: Mean Values from Execucomp Data
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mirrored the business cycle, plummeting 43.9 percent, before rising 130 percent from
2002 to 2006. Despite an upward trend since 2009, mean executive compensation in
2010 is down 34 percent from its 2006 peak.
Salary income shows the least volatility and on average grows more slowly than
overall compensation. As a share of overall executive compensation, salary income
falls by roughly half over the last two decades — from a 35 percent share in 1992 to
an 18 percent share in 2010. Salaries increase by 4.4 percent from 1992 to the 2000
peak. From 2000 to 2010, they increase another 10.3 percent.
Realized income from stock options is the major driver underlying the overall trends.
Because this source is not measured when vested or issued, it likely reflects earnings
from earlier periods, as well as gains or losses driven by changes in the price of the
underlying stock after vesting. Not surprisingly, the value of stock options swings wildly
with the stock market. At the beginning of the period, this source represents 35 percent
of total executive compensation. It peaks as a share of total executive compensation at
63 percent in 1999 and reaches a nadir, at 19 percent, in 2009. Despite rising in absolute
terms by 363 percent from 1992 to 2000 and by 127 percent from 2002 to 2006, the
value of stock options was up just 55.9 percent on net from 1992 to 2010. From 2000
to 2010, their value fell by 33.7 percent, on net.
The decline of stock options at the end of the last decade roughly coincides with a
reporting requirement change adopted by the SEC in 2006. The changes were intended
to provide a more complete and transparent picture of executives’ compensation, and
in particular were meant to address concerns over the backdating of options (Borges,
2012). These changes, however, complicate the construction of a consistent measure of
executive compensation across years, as several Execucomp variables were dropped or
amended, while others were added, beginning in 2006. Among the changes, compensation that had been reported as long-term incentive plan compensation and restricted
stock grants are now grouped in other categories. Post 2005, our definition of executive compensation includes non-equity incentive plan compensation and the value of
(vested) stock awards in their place.18
Non-equity incentive plan payments are primarily cash incentives tied to a firm’s
performance. Prior to 2006 they were mostly a subset of bonuses, and partly a subset
of long-term incentive plan compensation. Post 2006, non-equity incentive plan compensation accounts for 76 percent of total bonuses (roughly the sum of “bonus” and
non-equity incentive plan compensation) on average per year. We impute non-equity
incentive plan compensation going back to 2000 using this ratio. In terms of volatility,
total bonuses are closer to stock options than salaries. Mean bonuses roughly doubled
from 2001 to 2006, rising from $310,000 on average to $597,000 in 2006. Early evidence suggests that the Great Recession may be merely a hiccup in this trend, as mean
bonuses fell to $379,000 on average in 2008 before recovering to $555,000 on average in
2010.
18

Borges (2012) provides a discussion of the reporting requirement changes.
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Stock awards represent the value of equity awards that are not options and that vest
within the year. This measure is a more relevant component of annual compensation
than restricted stock grants, if one wants a measure analogous to annual taxable income.
Stock awards are somewhat less volatile than bonuses or options, but are a large component of total compensation. Between 2008 and 2010 stock awards were the largest
single component of mean executive compensation, with an average value of $680,000
in 2010. Average stock awards between 2006 and 2010 ($600,000) were roughly twice as
large as the average restricted stock grants between 2000 and 2005 ($250,000). It is not
known whether this represents a shift from options to other stock awards compensation
(options declined during the Great Recession and have not recovered) or a more direct
consequence of the change in disclosure rules.
C. Comparing Executives with Similarly Situated Taxpayers
Not all executives have extraordinarily high incomes. Even when looking at only the
five highest paid executives at publicly traded firms, those at the very bottom of this
distribution have taxable incomes (net of capital gains) that are negative, on average.
Moving to the 5th percentile, average incomes from 2000 to 2010 were $144,000 — well
within the top 5 percent of the overall income distribution, but still rather moderate.
However, the vast majority of executives in the Execucomp (i.e., generally CEOs plus
the next four highest paid executive at firms in the S&P 1500 Index) have incomes that
are well above the top 1 percent of the overall income distribution.
Figure 3 shows that taxable income for the 5th percentile of our matched sample
of executives is generally higher than the 95th percentile of the overall distribution
of tax filers. The 99th percentile of the overall distribution falls below that of the 20th
percentile of executives ($309,000 average).19 Figure 4 reveals that taxable income at
the 99.9th percentile (i.e., the top 0.1 of the top 1 percent) is quite similar to that for the
70th percentile (an average of $1.5 million) of the distribution of matched executives.
Income for the 99.99th percentile of taxpayers is similar to those at the 90th percentile
($4.4 million average) of the distribution of matched executives. Taxable income at the
95th percentile of the matched sample ($7.8 million average) is, on average, over 60
percent larger than that at the 99.99th percentile of the overall distribution. At the 99th
percentile (average $21.4 million) of the matched distribution, average taxable income
is roughly 350 percent larger than that at the 99.99th percentile of the overall distribution.
Thus, our matched sample is, in general, not only characterized by high incomes, but by
extraordinarily high incomes. That is, 30 percent of our matched sample is composed
of incomes that are higher than 999 out of 1,000 taxpayers — with a sizable portion of
our distribution not having a close comparison group in the work of Piketty and Saez
(2003), who do not present incomes for percentiles beyond the 99.99th.
19

All real measures are in 2000 dollars (as adjusted by the CPI-U), unless otherwise stated.

Recent Income Trends for Top Executives: Evidence from Tax Return Data

927

Figure 3
Taxable Income for Executives and All Taxpayers
700

600

2000$ (Thousands)

500

400

300

200

100

0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Year
P5 Executive

P10 Executive

P20 Executive

P30 Executive

P40 Executive

P95 All

P99 All

P99.5 All

Notes: Dotted lines represent taxable income at points in the distribution of the Execucomp
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tabulated by Piketty and Saez (2003)).
Source: Authors’ calculations from IRS tax return data and tabulations from IRS data by Piketty
and Saez (2003)

D. Trends Since 2000
The first decade of the 21st century was an unusual period. The decade began with
a minor recession in the aftermath of the bursting of the tech bubble. The housing
and financial sectors fueled economic growth through 2006, after which the economy
stalled and then was hit by the financial crisis and Great Recession, from which it has
yet to fully recover. As a result, 2010 pre-tax incomes for most percentiles in the top
10 percent (of the overall distribution) are about the same (in real terms) as they were
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Figure 4
Taxable Income for Executives and All Taxpayers
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and Saez (2003)

in 2000. The exception is individuals in the top half of one percent of the distribution,
who experienced declines in real income. For example, incomes fell (i.e., real incomes,
not income shares) by 2 percent for those at the 99.5th percentile, by 7.4 percent for
those at the 99.9th percentile, and by 12.4 percent for those at the 99.99th percentile.
Despite declines for those at the right-tail of the distribution, trends over the past several decades suggest these top groups will more than make up for this decline as the
economy strengthens.
Turning to our matched sample, Figures 3 and 4 suggest most executives experienced
substantial increases in real taxable income (again excluding capital gains). In fact, from
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the 5th to 60th percentiles, we find income growth of between 34 and 43 percent over
this period. Figure 3 suggests executives fared better over this period than did similarly
situated taxpayers, who in general experienced no net income growth (as tabulated by
Piketty and Saez, 2003).20
It is not until the 90th percentile of our matched sample that incomes fall in real terms.
Average taxable income (excluding capital gains) at the 90th percentile of our matched
sample is over $4.4 million on average, which roughly corresponds to the 99.99th
percentile of the overall distribution income distribution. In this case the pattern for
executives and similarly situated taxpayers is nearly identical. Real taxable income for
executives at the 90th percentile of our matched sample fell from 2000 to 2010 by close
to 11 percent, as compared to a decline of about 12.5 percent for the 99.99th percentile
for all tax returns. Moving up the distribution, the drop in taxable income for executives
is much larger — and average incomes are so high that no comparable income group
exists in Piketty and Saez’s (2003) tabulations. At the 95th percentile ($7.8 million average taxable income) of our matched sample, taxable income fell by close to one quarter
from 2000 to 2010. At the 99th percentile ($21.4 million average taxable income), the
decline was over 28 percent.
The coefficient of variation normalizes these data to focus on variation (as measured
by the standard deviation) as a share of mean income for each of the percentiles (Table
3). For both the IRS and Execucomp income measures, volatility increases for higher
percentiles of the income distribution. The increase in volatility is much greater for
the Execucomp measure, where the coefficient of variation ranges from 0.09 for the 5th
percentile to 0.27 for the 99th percentile. For taxable income, this measure ranges from
0.14 for the 5th percentile and peaks at 0.22 for the 95th percentile.

Table 3
The Coefficient of Variation for Various Points in the Income Distribution
P5

P10

P20

P30

P40

P50

P60

P70

P80

P90

P95

Taxable income

0.141 0.129 0.148 0.159 0.174 0.188 0.200 0.214 0.213 0.221 0.223

Executive
compensation

0.090 0.115 0.145 0.167 0.179 0.190 0.194 0.199 0.194 0.201 0.229

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IRS and Execucomp data

20

As noted in Section II, this analysis is of repeated cross-sections and thus does not follow the same cohort
over time.
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E. Income Trends by Industry
Figure 5 reports trends in mean gross income for Execucomp executives in selected
industries for 2000 to 2010. Industry codes are from the Execucomp data, while the gross
income measure (net of capital gains) is from the tax data. Gross income is constructed in
a manner analogous to Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010) and is composed of total income
(as reported on the Form 1040) less taxable Social Security benefits, unemployment
compensation, state tax refunds, the deduction for self-employment taxes, and longterm capital gains. Not surprisingly, incomes fluctuate substantially with the business

Figure 5
Mean Gross Income for Top Executives, by Industry
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cycle and both levels and trends vary by industry. However, somewhat surprisingly,
real mean incomes for many industries were higher in 2010 than in 2000; in fact, this
is true for our matched sample overall.
One might suspect that executives in finance would have suffered disproportionately
during the Great Recession. This certainly was the case in 2008: top executives in finance
and insurance reported incomes that were 33 percent lower than in 2007 on average.
However, by 2009, incomes for this group were above their 2007 level. In fact, Figure
5 suggests the period from 2000 to 2003 was actually worse for this group: mean gross
income (at least through 2010) has not returned to its peak in 2000.
Top executives in real estate, also at the center of the financial crisis, suffered bigger
losses than those in finance. From 2000 to 2006, mean annual gross income for executives in real estate was 35 to 85 percent higher (depending on the year) than annual
averages for the full matched sample. In 2009 and 2010, income for this sector was
about equal to the overall mean.21
Recall that Kaplan and Rauh (2010) compare top executives in the financial and nonfinancial sectors for the years 1994 and 2004 using Execucomp income measures, as
opposed to those from tax returns. Based on the trends in Figure 5, it appears that the
pair of years chosen for this type of analysis can have a big impact on the results. For
example, in two of the 11 years in our sample, gross income for executives in finance
is just 6 percent or 7 percent above the mean for our full matched sample. However, in
three of the years, executives in finance report incomes 69 percent to 85 percent higher
than the overall average.
F. Income Growth over Selected Years
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report income growth over pairs of years for executives in a number of industries. The tables are broken down by segments of the top one percent of
the overall income distribution, as reported by Piketty and Saez (2003). As in Figure
5, these tables assign executives to industries based on Execucomp data, while using
income variables reported to the IRS. These tables are analogous to Tables 8 to 10 from
Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2010), focusing on various segments of the top 1 percent of the
income distribution. Note that Bakija, Cole, and Heim focus on average growth rates
for periods between 1979 and 2005 for various occupations. By contrast, we compare
growth rates over pairs of years between 2000 and 2010 and compare executives in
different industries. The occupation categories used by Bakija, Cole, and Heim are very
broad, and in many cases are more akin to industry classifications. Their data end in
2005, several years before the financial crisis and Great Recession.

21

Top executives in mining (not depicted in Figure 5) saw their incomes skyrocket through 2008, as incomes
in many other industries dropped. This may have been driven by increases in energy prices and the discovery and development of new shale oil and natural gas reserves.
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Table 4
Income Growth by Industry over Selected Years:
Executives in the 99-99.5th Percentiles of the Overall Income Distribution
NAICS
Non-finance
Finance and insurance
Mining, quarrying, and oil and
gas extraction
Utilities

2000–2002

2002–2006

2006–2009

2009–2010

–9.2
–10.1
–7.3

18.5
18.7
11.8

–10.2
–10.4
–9.4

3.0
4.1
1.5

–9.3

20.6

–9.8

4.1

Manufacturing

–8.9

18.5

–10.2

3.2

Wholesale trade

–11.9

23.7

–12.7

6.1

–7.2

19.5

–12.9

4.2

Transportation and warehousing

–12.9

19.6

–7.0

Information
Real estate and rental and
leasing
Professional, scientific, and
technical services
Health care and social assistance
Accommodation and food services

–10.6
–12.7

17.7
21.5

–9.5
–9.7

1.2
0.4

–10.0

18.8

–10.9

1.5

–13.6
–2.1

15.8
11.0

–7.6
–8.6

7.3
6.5

–9.3

18.4

–10.2

3.2

Retail trade

Overall

Source: Authors’ calculations based on income from the CDW, industry codes from the Execucomp and
income cutoffs from Piketty and Saez (2003)

Table 4 reports growth rates by industry for executives falling between the 99th and
99.5th percentile — i.e., the bottom half of the top one percent — of the overall income
distribution. For this part of the income distribution, growth rates vary greatly across
years; however, variation across industries is fairly modest. In particular, patterns
exhibited by both the financial and non-financial sectors (which receive much attention
in Kaplan and Rauh (2010)) are similar to those of the overall sample. For the overall
matched sample, income dropped by over 9.2 percent from 2000 to 2002, climbed by
18.4 percent from 2002 to 2006, and fell by 10.2 percent from 2006 to 2009. By comparison, Bakija, Cole, and Heim report that this group’s income increased at an annual
average real rate of 0.6 percent between 1979 and 2005. While a simple linear trend
connecting our 2000 and 2010 measures has a slope of about zero, this masks large
income swings over the decade.
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Table 5
Income Growth by Industry over Selected Years:
Executives in the 99.5th–99.9th Percentiles of the Overall Income Distribution
NAICS

2000–2002

2002–2006

2006–2009

2009–2010

Mining, quarrying, and oil and
gas extraction
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Information
Finance and insurance
Real estate and rental and leasing
Professional, scientific,
and technical services
Health care and social assistance
Accommodation and food services
Non-finance

–10.4

32.6

–16.7

2.7

–14.2
–15.7
–14.2
–8.7
–12.5
–13.5
–13.8
–13.9
–14.2
–10.5

30.0
22.0
27.8
27.2
30.0
28.3
26.6
24.3
31.1
25.0

–15.4
–20.5
–15.8
–21.4
–16.3
–16.3
–13.0
–14.5
–17.1
–15.3

7.9
9.2
6.0
10.4
7.1
2.2
8.8
6.2
1.6
5.3

–10.2
–13.0
–13.5

39.7
19.7
27.9

–15.6
–8.9
–15.4

4.1
12.8
6.4

Overall

–13.5

27.6

–15.3

6.3

Source: Authors’ calculations based on income from the CDW, industry codes from the Execucomp and
income cutoffs from Piketty and Saez (2003)

Moving to Table 5 and those above the 99.5th percentile but below the 99.9th percentile, growth rates are more volatile, but the overall trend is a good approximation for
most industries. Once again, the financial sector appears very similar to a composite
of the non-financial sectors. Variation in income growth across years is amplified
compared to the bottom half of the top 1 percent from Table 4. For the first three
sets of paired years, average income growth (or decline) is 50 percent larger than in
Table 4.
Table 6 reports measures for executives with incomes above the 99.9th percentile of
the overall income distribution. While average income in 2010 was roughly the same
as that in 2000 for most of the top 1 percent, incomes for the top permille — i.e., the
top tenth of the top 1 percent — were 13 percent lower at the end of this period. In
other respects, the patterns in the top permille are quite different from others in the
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Table 6
Income Growth by Industry over Selected Years:
Executives in the 99.9th–100th Percentiles of the Overall Income Distribution
NAICS
Mining, quarrying, and oil and
gas extraction
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing

2000–2002

2002–2006

2006–2009

2009–2010

–54.5

189.7

–26.2

1.7

–18.3
9.3
–18.0

59.3
78.5
17.8

–12.5
–46.2
–16.1

–23.4
–2.4
16.9

Wholesale trade

–31.8

50.7

–21.3

27.7

Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing
Information
Finance and insurance
Real estate and rental and leasing
Professional, scientific,
and technical services
Health care and social assistance
Accommodation and food services
Non-finance

–23.9
–14.6
–37.6
–30.5
–50.4
–46.1

12.7
31.2
18.3
51.7
38.4
39.5

0.1
–1.9
14.0
–42.6
–21.9
–31.4

–1.9
20.6
–9.1
18.9
2.6
45.8

–5.3
–21.8
–38.4

27.5
68.3
58.0

–45.6
–25.8
–22.7

28.8
11.7
18.5

Overall

–36.1

55.0

–26.3

19.1

Source: Authors’ calculations based on income from the CDW, industry codes from the Execucomp,
and income cutoffs from Piketty and Saez (2003)

top 1 percent. Variation across industries and growth rates across paired years are
greatly exaggerated compared to other segments of the top 1 percent. The early part
of the decade was especially volatile for individuals in this group, who experienced
an income drop from 2000 to 2002 that was 170 percent greater than the decline for
those between the 99.5th and 99.9th percentiles. The post-tech bubble recovery compensated for these losses, as the highest permille’s income growth was 55 percent from
2002 to 2006, or twice that of those in the next four permilles. As with the bursting
of the tech bubble, the impact of the Great Recession was greater for the top permille
than for the next four permilles, as average incomes for the former group dropped
by 26.3 percent from 2006 to 2009, or 70 percent more than the decline in average
incomes for the latter group. While all segments of the top 1 percent experienced
income gains from 2009 to 2010, the top permille reported enormous gains of 19.1
percent.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The years 2000 to 2010 were a tumultuous period for top executive incomes, as was
the case for the broader economy. What are now classified as stock awards have grown
greatly in importance over this period, and are arguably the largest source executive
compensation. Stock options are the key source of volatility in executive incomes. In
“good” years, these options may represent more than one-third of compensation for
top executives. Despite steep drops in executive compensation in the early 2000s and
during the Great Recession, executive pay for this group has more than doubled in real
terms since 1992.
Not all top executives have extraordinarily high incomes. However, the vast majority
are concentrated at the very top of the income distribution: 95 percent of top executives
are in the top 5 percent of the income distribution and 30 percent are in the top 0.1
percent of the overall income distribution.
Executive incomes, mirroring trends in the broader income distribution, are most
volatile at the right tail of the distribution. In general, trends for top executives in finance
and non-finance industries were quite similar from 2000 to 2010. This is consistent with
findings from Kaplan and Rauh (2010) for an earlier period. Patterns for those above
the 99.9th percentile of the income distribution are quite different from other segments
of the top 1 percent. In general, income swings were amplified for this group and
showed greater heterogeneity across industries. At this percentile, the finance sector
was an outlier as the income decline from 2006 to 2009 in that sector was much more
pronounced than that experienced by executives in non-finance sectors.
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APPENDIX A: MATCHING SUMMARY
The CDW and Execucomp do not use the same numeric individual identifiers. For example, the
CDW includes Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TINs), while the Execucomp includes an executive
identification number (EXECID). Matches can be made based on names and Employer Identification Numbers (EINs). However, matching on strings is complicated, as names are not unique and
some individuals may use nicknames on one form and formal names another. With over 125 million tax returns available per year, matching can be complicated and time-consuming. We initially
select individuals with at least one Form W-2 with Box 1 (earned) income exceeding $99,000 in
a given year. Our sample is then comprised of all the Form W-2s associated with that individual
for that year. These W-2 data — which contain between 5 million and 8 million observations per
year — include EINs and individuals’ names. They are available for tax years 2000 through 2011.
A1. Match Strategy 1
We use two separate, but similar, matching strategies. Both involve creating annual (i.e., yearspecific) Execucomp extracts to match with annual (i.e., year-specific) CDW samples. The first
strategy matches executives to CDW data based on the last name and first initial of an individual
for a given year. Any match (i.e., an EXECID-TIN match) with a conflicting year of birth, gender,
or middle initial is dropped. We further filter these matches in three successive waves.
Any “matched observations” where the first name, middle initial, gender, and EIN match are
placed in the first bin. All of the executives found in the first bin are then stripped out of the
Execucomp sample, and the same match is performed (by last name and first initial, with the
“conflict” filters) on the remaining Execucomp data. These matches — which are placed in the
second bin — are subject to slightly different criteria: the EINs are not required to match, but
the first name, middle initial, gender, and year of birth are required to match.
After removing the executives found in the first two bins from the Execucomp data, the third
bin of matches is identified using the same match on the remaining Execucomp data. The criteria
for the third bin are weaker than the first two: the first name and middle initial of the individual
must match.
All of the matches at each of the three stages are tested for between-year and within-year
variation in the EXECID-TIN matches. For example, if an executive has three matched TINs in
the same year, those three TINs must be the same. Similarly, if an executive has matched TINs
in multiple years, all of the TINs must be the same. If either of these criteria does not hold all of
the “matches” for that executive are dropped.
As expected, the amount of within-year and between-year TIN-EXECID conflicts increase
with each successive bin (i.e., more matches are dropped). Similarly, the matches found in each
successive wave decrease dramatically.
A2. Match Strategy 2
The second strategy matches year-specific Execucomp extracts with year-specific CDW tax
data by EIN, last name, and first initial. Matches with conflicting middle names, genders, or years
of birth are dropped (as in Strategy 1). The matches are then subject to the criterion that either
the first names must match or the middle initials must match.
As before, EXECID matches with conflicting TINs within a year or between years are dropped.
In this case, very few observations are dropped. Finally, executives who are matched with the
same TIN as another executive are dropped. This happens in a small number of cases where
executives do not have unique Execucomp identifiers.

